IMPORTANT PROVISION OF LABOUR LAWS

If your are searching top labour lawyer advocate in jaipur for High Court litigation then your are at right place now... The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 was amended by The Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 2010[1]. The Amendment Act came into force with effect from15.09.2010[2]. Change in the definition of Appropriate Government[3] Section 2 (a) of the Act has been amended to clarify as to which is the Appropriate Government in certain establishments. The amendment seeks to provide that a Company in which not less than fifty-one per cent of the paid-up capital is held by the Central Government, or any corporation referred to in this clause, established by or under any law made by Parliament, or the Central Public Sector Undertaking, subsidiary companies set up by the principal undertaking and autonomous bodies owned or controlled by the Central Government, the Appropriate Government is the Central Government. Likewise, sub-clause (ii) is amended to provide that in relation to any other industrial disputes, including the State Public Sector Undertaking, subsidiary companies set up by the principal undertaking and autonomous bodies owned or controlled by the State Government, the Appropriate Government is the State Government. Insertion of Proviso in Section 2 in relation to engagement of Contract Labour- A proviso has been inserted in Section 2 clarifying that in case of a dispute between a contractor and the contract labour employed through the contractor in any industrial establishment where such dispute first arose, the Appropriate Government shall be the Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be, which has control over such industrial establishment. Increase in wage ceiling[4] Wage ceiling of supervisor has been enhanced from Rs.1600/- per month to Rs. 10,000/- per month, which means now any person working in any industry doing any manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory work drawing wages up to Rs. 10000/- will be a workman. Earlier this limit was up to Rs.1600/-. By this amendment the coverage of workman has been increased and more people are now covered under the Act. Amendment enabling workman to made an application direct to the Labour Court or Tribunal[5] With the amendment to Section 2 A, a workman can now directly make an application to the Labour Court or Tribunal for adjudication of the dispute where it involves discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination of service after the expiry of three months from the date he has made the application to the Conciliation Officer of the Appropriate Government for conciliation of the dispute, and the Labour Court or Tribunal shall have the power and jurisdiction to adjudicate upon such dispute, as if it were a dispute referred to it by the Appropriate Government and all the provisions of the Act shall be applicable as if it were a dispute referred to it by the Appropriate Government. Limitation[6]- The application to the Labour Court or Tribunal shall be made before the expiry of the period of three years from the date of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination of service otherwise howsoever. Appointment as Presiding Officer of Labour Court/Tribunal [7] Earlier, only judicial officers were eligible to become the Judges (Presiding Officers) of Labour Court/ Tribunal. Now, with the amendment the Deputy Chief Labour Commissioner / Joint Labour Commissioner with degree of Law & having 7 years of experience are eligible to become Judges of the Labour Court/ Tribunal. Insertion of new Chapter II B –Setting up of Grievance Redressal Machinery [8] These provisions do not apply to workmen for whom there is an established Redressal Mechanism in the establishment concerned. Every industrial establishment employing twenty or more workmen shall set up a Grievance Redressal Committee for resolution of disputes arising out of individual grievances. The Grievance Redressal Committee shall consist of equal number of members representing the employer and the workmen and shall not exceed more than 6 members. As far as practicable, representation should be given to women members also. The Chairperson shall be selected from the employer and the workmen alternatively on rotation basis every year. The proceedings of the Grievance Redressal Committee may be completed within 45 days on receipt of the written application by or on behalf of the aggrieved party. The workman aggrieved by the decision of the Grievance Redressal Committee shall be entitled to prefer an appeal to the employer and the employer shall dispose of the appeal within one month from the date of receipt of the appeal and send a copy of the decision to the workman concerned. Execution of Awards passed by Labour Court/Tribunal [9] Earlier there was no such provision in the Act providing for the manner in which the Awards pronounced by the Labour Court/Tribunal could be executed. By insertion of Sub-Section (9) to Section 11, it is now provided that every award made, order issued or settlement arrived at by or before the Labour Court / Tribunal shall be executed in accordance with the procedure laid down for execution of orders or decrees of a Civil Court under Order 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Labour Court / Tribunal which passed the Award, or made the Order or recorded the Settlement shall transmit such Award, Order or Settlement to the Civil Court having jurisdiction and such Civil Court shall execute the same, as if it were a decree passed by it. An Analysis of the Amendments carried out in the Amendment Act- Amendments to Sec 2 (a) The amendment clarifies the position as to Appropriate Government for establishments and it is now clear that the appropriate government for the Bank is the Central Government. Amendment to Sec 2 A Certain States like Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu and Karnataka had brought in place an amendment to Sec 2A enabling the workman to raise an industrial dispute directly before the Labour Court or Tribunal in cases of dismissal, discharge or termination of services.[10] The Amendment to the Central Act is akin to the amendments already carried out by the State Amendments. Amendments carried out in Section 7, 7 A A PIL was filed before the Hon’ble Punjab and Haryana High Court by an Advocate[11] praying for quashing Sections 7 and 7 A of the ID Act, 1947 inasmuch as the said provisions do not make advocates with any length of experience at the Bar, eligible to be appointed as Presiding Officers of the Labour Courts/Tribunals. The Hon’ble Punjab and Haryana High Court disposed of the Writ Petition by its Order dated 23.10.2008 declining to grant any relief but advised the Petitioner to make a representation to the Law Commission. The Law Commission of India considered the matter on the representation of the Petitioner in the Writ Petition and submitted a report[12] suggesting amendments to Section 7, 7 A and 7 B of the Industrial Disputes Act for making Advocates eligible to man Labour Courts/ Industrial Tribunals. The Law Commission of India referred to the observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in S.P.Sampath Kumar Vs. Union of India [13] wherein it was held that qualifications for appointments in many tribunals and other quasi-judicial bodies make it very clear that advocates with requisite years of practice at the Bar and in the concerned field are competent to man any tribunal. Therefore, the Law Commission suggested that Sections 7, 7A and 7 B of the ID Act should be amended to make advocates with requisite number of years of practice at the Bar eligible for appointment as Presiding Officers of the Labour Court and Industrial Tribunals. Unfortunately, the Amendment to Section 7 has only been to the effect that the Deputy Chief Labour Commissioner (Central) or the Joint Commissioner of the State Labour Department are eligible to be appointed as Presiding Officers of the Labour Court / Tribunal. Amendment by way of insertion of Chapter II B Grievance Redressal Machinery Where in an industrial establishment there is already in place an established Grievance Redressal Mechanism, in the light of Section 9 C (8) of the amendment, the provisions of the Chapter may not apply. At any rate, sub-section 7 of Section 9 C does not mention the time frame within which an appeal can be preferred by the workman against the decision of the Grievance Redressal Committee. Execution of Awards Earlier there was no provision for execution of Awards made by the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal. A penalty provision existed in Section 29, where under any person who commits a breach of any settlement or award, which is binding on him under the Act, would render himself punishable with imprisionment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine, or both and where the breach is a continuing one, with a further fine which may extend to two hundred rupees for every day during which the breach continues after the conviction for the first.[15] Latest Case Law on Industrial Disputes Act relevant to Banks An earnest attempt is made to discuss the case law on Industrial Disputes Act without straying into the other aspects of service law and we trust that the Case Law will be useful. The case law is divided in accordance with the Sections under the ID Act. Section 2-A Reference espoused by unrecognized union. Whether the union represents substantial number of workmen employed with the employer does not make any difference. Whether the individual worker raises dispute by himself or whether the dispute on his behalf is espoused by a recognized union or substantial number of workmen in the industry irrelevant. Reference maintainable as the dispute falls within Section 2A of the Act. The only question is whether in a reference which has been espoused by the union regarding an individual dispute which is a deemed industrial dispute, must the dispute be espoused by a recognised union or must it be supported by substantial number of workmen working in the industry. Proceeding on the footing that there is no material to support the contention of the petitioner union that it represents substantial number of workmen who were employed with respondent company, that would not make any difference. Whether the individual workman raises dispute by himself or whether the dispute on his behalf is espoused by a recognised union or substantial number of workmen in the industry would be irrelevant. The reference would be maintainable as long as the dispute falls within Section 2(A) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The amendment to the law has not been made with a view to defeat the rights of an individual workmen to raise dispute which earlier he could not have raised, but has been done in order to enable him to get his grievances redressed even if substantial number of workmen or the recognised union in the industry does not espouse his cause. The fact that the union espoused the cause would not mean that the dispute must satisfy the ingredients of industrial dispute within the meaning of Section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act. It would be sufficient that it is a deemed industrial dispute within the meaning of Section 2(A) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Therefore, the order of the Labour Court in holding that reference would not be maintainable as it was not espoused by substantial number of workmen or by a recognised union clearly discloses an error of law apparent on the face of record and the award is liable to be set aside. Maharashra General Kamgar Union vs. Haldyn Glass Works (Bombay HC)[16] Section 2 (s) Merely because employee not performing any managerial or supervisory duties would not ipso facto make him a workman. A perusal of Section 2 (s) indicates that a person would come within the purview of the said definition if he is employed in any industry and performs any manual, skilled, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory work. The question as to whether the employee has been performing clerical work or not is required to be determined upon arriving at a finding as regard the dominant nature thereof. Management of Sonepat Co-operative Sugar Mills vs. Ajit Singh (SC)[17] Failure to perform statutory duty. Section 2 of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Settlement was entered into by the Petitioners and Respondents for the purpose of enhanced pension on ad-hoc basis. Petitioners were not covered under the definition of workmen, so no enhanced pension was given. Whether a retired employee can raise an industrial dispute under the provisions of Sub-section (k) of Section 2 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Held, industrial dispute means and includes any dispute between the employers and the workmen which is connected with the employment or non-employment or terms of employment or with the conditions of labour, of any person. Therefore, it is for the workmen to participate in a bipartite settlement and it is also open for them to take up an issue of any person even though he is not a party. Held, on perusal of the specified provision it was clear that a retired employee cannot be included in the definition of workman. Further industrial dispute means and includes any dispute or difference between the employers and workmen. As such, the workmen are entitled to be the parties to a bipartite settlement in between the employers and the workmen under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and it is also open for them to take up an issue of any person including the retired workmen In the bipartite settlements. The workmen took up the issue of pension of the retired employees of the Respondent bank because the interest of any person can be the subject-matter of a settlement in between the employers and the workmen having a direct bearing on the substantial interest of the workmen. But a retired employee cannot be a party to the industrial dispute. Standard Chartered Grindlays Bank Retired Employees Association and Ors Vs. UOI and ors (Calcutta HC)[18] Ss.4, 7 & 33A – Power of Conciliation Officer restricted to mediating and promoting settlement of disputes and he has no power of adjudication u/s 33 A. Maharashtra General Kamgar Union vs. Pix Transmissions Ltd. (Bombay HC)[19] Section 10 – Whether reference can be made by the Appropriate Government at the instance of an unrecognized Union under Section 10 (1) of the Act? Held, while making a reference, it is not mandatory for Appropriate Government to consider whether or not disputed is raised by recognized Union. Appropriate Government does not determine rights of parties by referring dispute to an Industrial Adjudicator. Therefore, it is not possible to hold that at stage of reference unrecognized union has no locus to raise dispute for reference under Section 10 (1) of the Act. Bharat Forge Limited vs Maharashtra General Kamgar (Bombay HC)[20] A stand was taken that they were working under the contractor. It does not lie in their mouth to take a contradictory and inconsistent plea that they were also workman of the principal employer. It is not permissible to raise mutually destructive plea. Such plea should not be allowed to be raised even in industrial adjudication. Steel Authority of India Ltd Vs. UOI (SC)[21] Referring to the ratio in Steel Authority of India Ltd vs. UOI and ors (see footnote 20 supra), it was held that mutually destructive plea is impermissible in law and should not be allowed to be raised in industrial adjudication. Himmat Singh and Ors Vs. ICI India Ltd and ors (SC)[22] All India Grindlays Bank Employees Federation represented the minority workmen of the Bank. A strike notice was issued to the management of the appellant-bank by this Union. After discussions with all the parties, a settlement was arrived at between the appellant-bank and the majority Union. The minority Union backed out and refused to sign the settlement. The minority Union informed the Conciliation Officer (Central) that it had not signed the settlement and later contended that the signing of the settlement by the Bank with the majority Union amounted to unfair labour practice. According to the minority union, sixty persons had not signed the settlement and were objecting to the same. Nearly three years thereafter, the majority union had submitted a fresh charter of demands and after holding discussions and negotiations, a fresh settlement was signed. At the instance of the minority union, the Central Government made a reference under Section 10(1) of the Act for adjudication by the Industrial Tribunal. Objecting to the reference the bank filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution before the High Court for quashing and setting aside the same. Writ petition was dismissed by a Single Judge. Appeal was preferred against the said decision before the Division Bench which also dismissed. Hence, the present appeal. Held, the circumstances of the case showed that no industrial dispute was in existence nor was there any apprehended dispute between the appellant-bank and the minority union. Thus, there was no need for reference for adjudication by the Industrial Tribunal. Reference being wholly futile, the same deserved to be quashed. ANZ Grindlays Bank Ltd (Now known as Standard Chartered Grindlays Bank Ltd) vs. UOI and ors (SC)[23] It is open to the Appropriate Government on failure report being received to reject making a reference to adjudication. However, the Appropriate Government has to record reasons under Section 12 (5) of the ID Act. The law is well settled that matters which could be gone into by industrial adjudication cannot be ordinarily decided by the Appropriate Government. The reason given by the Appropriate Government in refusing to make a reference was that the issue was decided by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Impugned Order set-aside and matter referred back to the Government to reconsider the case and pass an appropriate order. Ashok Raghoba Ambre Vs. UOI and ors (Bombay HC)[24] Reference made by Central Government regarding sham character of the contract through which workmen concerned were employed. Labour Court allowing reference on the assumption that incidents such as duties of contractor labourers being of a permanent nature showed the employment to be permanent. Held, the award proceeded on a fundamentally erroneous premises that the nature of the contract labourers” work brough them within the scope of “workmen” under the ID Act. That basis suffered from a fundamental error and disregarded the ground realities of such work. Airports Authority of India, Mumbai vs. Indian Airport Kamgar Union and others (Bombay HC)[25] Refer Also- Thakor Nagjibhai Bhailal vs. IPCL(Gujarat HC)[26] Section 11A – Extent of interference with the quantum of punishment imposed by an employer on a delinquent employee by the Labour Court in exercise of its power under Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 was in question in the appeal. Held, Power of Labour Court and/or Industrial Tribunal in terms of Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 to interfere with the quantum of punishment although cannot be denied, but said power should be exercised judiciously. Corrigendum has nothing to do with the nature or quantum of penalty. The same does not provide for a substitution of the penalty provided for in the Certified Standing Order. Certified Standing Order would prevail over circulars. Divisional Manager, Rajasthan SRTC vs. Kamruddin (SC)[27] The jurisdiction under Section 11A r/w 107A of the MP Industrial Relations Act 1962 to interfere with punishment when it is a discharge or dismissal can be exercised by Labour Court only when it is satisfied that discharge or dismissal is not justified. When an employee breaches discipline and employer terminates his services, it is not open to a Labour Court or an Industrial Tribunal to take view that punishment awarded is shockingly disproportionate to the charge proved. When a punishment of termination is awarded for hitting and injuring a superior officer supervising work of the employee, with no extenuating circumstance established, it cannot be said to be not justified. Since employee found guilty of hitting and injuring his superior officer at work place, in presence of other employees which clearly amounted to breach of discipline in organization. The Labour Court and High Court totally misdirected themselves while exercising their jurisdiction and setting aside the punishment. Termination order held to be justified. Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board vs Jagdish Chandra Sharma (SC)[28] Workman using abusive language against superior officer, that too twice, in presence of his subordinates cannot be termed indiscipline calling for lesser punishment in absence of any extenuating factor Punishment of dismissal not disproportionate to misconduct. It is no doubt true that after introduction of Section 11A in the Industrial Disputes Act, certain amount of discretion is vested with the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal in interfering with the quantum of punishment awarded by the Management where the concerned workman is found guilty of misconduct. The said area of discretion has been very well-defined by the various judgments of the Supreme Court and it is certainly not unlimited as has been observed by the Division Bench of the High Court. The discretion which can be exercised under Section 11A is available only on the existence of certain factors like punishment being disproportionate to the gravity of misconduct so as to disturb the conscience of the Court, or the existence of any mitigating circumstances which require the reduction of the punishment, or the past conduct of the workman which may persuade the Labour Court to reduce the punishment. In the absence of any such factors, the Labour Court cannot by way of sympathy alone exercise the power under Section 11A of the Act and reduce the punishment. Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd Vs. N.B.Naravade (SC)[29] It is not open to Labor Court to go into findings recorded by Enquiry Officer regarding misconduct committed by Respondent. It has been held in a number of judgments that punishment of removal/dismissal was appropriate punishment for employee found guilty of misappropriation of funds. The conductor possessed excess sum of money which was proved. The Labour Court and Judges of High Court misdirected themselves in insisting on evidence of passengers which was wholly not essential. There was no explanation forthcoming from the conductor for carrying excess amount. And this omission was sufficient to hold him guilty. This act was so grossly negligent that Respondent was not fit to be retained as a conductor. UP State Road Transport Corporation vs. Vinod Kumar (SC)[30] Interference by Court on the ground of proportionality of punishment should be in exceptional and rare cases after recording cogent reasons. Court should not interfere with the administrator’s decision unless it was illogical or suffers from procedural impropriety or was so shocking to the conscience of the Court, in the sense that it was in defiance of logic or moral standards. The scope of judicial review is limited to the deficiency in decision making process and not the decision. Unless the punishment imposed shocks the conscience of the Court/Tribunal, there is no scope for interference. In a normal course, if the punishment imposed is shockingly disproportionate, it would be appropriate to direct the Disciplinary or Appellate Authority to reconsider the penalty imposed. V.Ramana vs. APSRTC and ors (SC)[31] Refer also- Zonal Manager, Bank of India vs. GS, Bank of India Staff Union (Mad HC)[32] Ss. 12 (3) and 36 A- Any difficulty or doubt as to the interpretation of a settlement has to be referred to industrial adjudication and Writ Petition is not appropriate remedy. Tamil Nadu Pokkuvarathu Kazhaga Thozhilalar Nala Sangam vs. State of TN (Mad HC)[33] Sections 14 & 15 – Labour Court had no power to pass “no dispute award” when the workman fails to appear before it. The Labour Court has to answer the reference on the basis of the merits of the case. Satendra Singh Gujar vs. Bank of India (MP HC)[34] Section 17 (B) - Relief cannot be denied merely because the award is ex-parte. Ramniranjan Kedia Tourism Services Pvt Ltd Vs. Tilakraj and ors (Delhi HC)[35] The issue considered in the case is whether provisions of Section 17-B of Act will be applicable in a case where management in writ petition has challenged order of Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal whereby its application seeking approval of order of dismissal was dismissed by Labour Court or Tribunal? - Held, award passed upon complete determination of an industrial dispute referred to Labour Court has wider jurisdiction in comparison to jurisdiction exercisable by Industrial Tribunal. Award attains finality once it is published and award becomes enforceable on expiry of 30 days from date of its publication. Order passed by Industrial Tribunal, where it rejects application of Management, becomes operative forthwith and as per settled law, no further order is required to be passed and workman continues to be in service. If employer contravenes provisions of Section 33 of Act, he is liable to be punished under Section 31 of Act and Industrial Tribunal would have jurisdiction to pass appropriate orders upon an application by aggrieved workman. Award by itself cannot be read in isolation and given a meaning so as to render expression directing reinstatement ineffective or inconsequential. Order passed by Tribunal after it has taken complete proceedings and determined controversy in accordance with law and after affording full opportunity to parties to lead evidence in support of their claim. Culmination of such judicial proceedings would have to be, therefore treated analogous to and covered under expression of award directing reinstatement. Delhi Transport Corporation vs. Jagdish Chander (Delhi HC)[36] Present applications have been filed for challenging jurisdiction of court to grant relief to workman on his application seeking grant of wages during pendency of management's challenge to awards in favour of workman directing his reinstatement into service. Held, there is no restriction on High Court which is granting relief as an interim measure during pendency of a challenge by management to an award directing reinstatement of workman. Court could have passed such an order with respect to back wages or arrears payable by employer to employee without taking recourse to Section 17-B of Act. In the instant case, workman has alleged illegal termination of his services and industrial dispute has remained pending culminating in award which has been impugned before this Court. Wages which were being paid to workman in back year cannot by any measure be considered to be a fair and reasonable wage. Accordingly, petitioner is directed to make payment of wages to respondent No.3/workman at rate, whichever is higher, between last drawn wages and minimum wages which are notified by authorities from time to time. This application is allowed in the above terms. Matters did not end here. Workman again sought same relief which was also dismissed as withdrawn. Workman was admittedly reinstated in service pursuant to impugned orders and as such cannot claim any interim relief in respect of relevant period. Present application is not concerned with alleged termination of service nor any proceedings thereafter. Consequently, petitioner at this stage cannot be held to be entitled to any relief for relevant period. Food Craft Instt. vs. Rameshwar Sharma and Anr (Delhi HC)[37] There can be no dispute that power under Section 11A has to be exercised judiciously and the interference is possible only when the Tribunal is not satisfied with the findings and further concludes that punishment imposed by the Management is highly disproportionate to the degree of guilt of the workman concerned. Mavji C Lakum vs. Central Bank of India (SC)[38] See also Executive Engineer vs. Ayubbhai Ladharbhai (Gujarat)[39] Kiloskar Pneumatic Kamgar Sangh vs. Kirloskar Pneumatic Co. Ltd. (Bombay HC)[40] CM, Indian Bank Vs. Anil Kumar Sukhvasia (Gujarat HC)[41] Section 18 An Award of Tribunal is binding on all present and future workmen. It cannot be said that Award is not binding on them only because they were not parties. Punjab National Bank and Ors Vs. Manjeet Singh and Anr (SC)[42] Union of workmen of appellant demanded appointment with Management regarding compassionate appointment. Management offered consideration of Union’s suggestion sympathetically. Held, that this does not amount to settlement in terms of Section 2 (p) of Central Act and binding as such on parties under Section 18 (1) of said Act. Indian Drugs and Pharmaceuticals Ltd Vs. Devki Devi and Ors (SC)[43] Section 22 & 33 – Respondents went on an illegal strike. Respondents dismissed from service after holding a disciplinary enquiry. Petitions were filed under Section 2A of the Act for re-instatement with back wages and continuity of service. Labour Court held that the strike was illegal, but substituted the punishment of dismissal by order of discharge and awarded compensation to each workman. On appeal, a Single Judge of the High Court allowed the Writ Petition filed by the Respondents on the ground of non -compliance of Section 33(2)(b) of the Act and directed re-instatement of the workmen with full back wages and continuity of service on the ground that a copy of the strike notice was sent to the Conciliation Officer and, therefore, conciliation proceedings were pending on the date of dismissal and since the dismissal was without the approval of the Conciliation Officer in terms of Section 33 of the Act the same was illegal. Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the Writ Appeals holding that the Judgment of this Court did not make any distinction between the proceeding pending before the Conciliation Officer and those pending before an Industrial Tribunal. Held, as the date of notice is 14th March, 1991 and the proposed strike was on 24th March, 1991, it cannot be treated to be a notice as contemplated under Section 22(1)(a) as six weeks time before proposed strike was not given. Expression giving such notice as appearing in Section 22(1)(b) refers to the notice under Section 22(1)(a) which refers to six weeks advance notice. Therefore, the workmen cannot go on strike within six weeks notice in terms of Section 22(1)(a) and 14 days thereafter in terms of Section 22(1)(b). Hence, the conciliation proceedings were not meeting the requirements of law. Since there was no conciliation proceedings as per law Section 33 will not be attracted and no need for seeking permission from Conciliation Officer for dismissal of Respondents. Impugned Judgments set aside. Management, Essorpe Mills Ltd vs. Presiding Officer, Labour Court and Ors (SC)[44] Section 25 A, 25 G and 25 H- Evidence produced by workman establishing his being employee of bank. Not rebutted by Bank by producing contra evidence. Merely because there was no appointment letter, it does not mean that he is not workman engaged by the Bank. Bank of Baroda vs. Ghemarbhai Harjibhai Rabari (SC)[45] Section 25 B and 25 F Burden is on the workman to prove that he had worked for 240 days. Employer producing attendance register and muster roll clearly showing that the workman had not worked continuously in preceding 12 months for 240 days prior to his alleged retrenchment. Labour Court and High Court committed error in law and fact in directing reinstatement. Surendranagar District Panchayat vs. Dahyabhai Amarsinh (SC)[46] It is not the case that Badli workers completed 240 days of service during 12 months preceding termination as contemplated by Sections 25F/25B. Badli workers did not acquire any legal right to continue in service and not entitled to protection under Industrial Disputes Act. The question as to what extent, principles of natural justice are required to be complied with would depend upon the fact situation obtaining in each case. The principles of natural justice cannot be applied in vacuum. It cannot be put in any straitjacket formula. The principles of natural justice are furthermore not required to be complied with when it will lead to an empty formality. What is needed for the employer in a case of this nature is to apply the objective criteria for arriving at the subjective satisfaction. If the criteria required for arriving at an objective satisfaction stands fulfilled, the principles of natural justice may not have to be complied with, in view of the fact that the same stood complied with before imposing punishments upon the respondents on each occasion and, thus, the respondents, therefore, could not have improved their stand even if a further opportunity was given. Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation and Anr vs. S.G.Kotturappa and anr (SC)[47] Termination of service of a daily wager. Award passed by Labour Court directing reinstatement of Appellant with full back wages and continuity of service. The High Court set aside the award holding that even if Appellant completed 240 days of service in a calendar year he was not entitled to reinstatement or back wages Compensation and not reinstatement with full back wages in a case where the workman who had completed 240 days of work in a year preceding the date of termination, particularly, daily wagers is proper. A distinction to be made between daily wager who does not hold a post and a permanent employee. The High Court erred in not awarding compensation to Appellant while upsetting award of reinstatement and back wages. Host of factors, inter alia, manner and method of appointment, nature of employment and length of service relevant for determining amount of compensation. A compensation of Rs. 50,000/- was awarded to Appellant. Jagbir Singh vs. Haryana State Agriculture Marketing Board and Anr (SC)[48] Disengagement of daily wager. Tribunal rejected claim of respondent workman on ground of delay and laches of 13 years. And also on merits as he did not complete service of 240 days in Bank and not entitled to benefit of Section 25F. Respondent worked for 58 days on casual basis. Hence, not entitled to any relief on his belated claim. High Court, on erroneous view of facts and circumstances of case, allowed writ petition of respondent without taking into account categoric finding of fact that workman had not completed 240 days of service in Bank. Such casual approach not warranted. Order of High Court set aside and that of Tribunal affirmed. Manager (Now Regional Director) RBI vs. Gopinath Sharma and Anr (SC)[49] Relief of re-instatement of a daily wager was not justified where his engagement had continued for about 7 years intermittently about 25 years ago and monetary compensation would meets the ends of justice. In charge Officer and Anr vs. Shankar Shetty (SC)[50] Workman serving in different branches of bank. Held, such service could not be clubbed to reckon continuous service of 240 days, unless he was appointed by one and the same authority. Bank of Baroda, Kota vs. Presiding Officer, CGIT cum Labour Court, Kota and anr. (Rajasthan HC)[51] Section 25 B, 25 G and 25 H – The Tribunal ignored that there was no pleading by respondent in support of alleged violation of Section 25G. The reference to the Tribunal did not also refer to Section 25G but only to Section 25H. It is not open to Tribunal to go off on a tangent to conclude that termination of services of respondent was invalid because of violation of Section 25G. The plea of the Management./Appellant that there was no vacancy and the engagement was merely an ad hoc arrangement was not considered by Tribunal. The contention that there was violation of Para 497 of Sastri Award wholly misconceived. The appointment was entirely ad hoc without following any rule. Though principle of res judicata may not disqualify respondent from contending that his termination was invalid, not raising of issue earlier was factor which should have been taken into consideration by Tribunal in weighing evidence. Several advertisements issued offering re-employment in terms of Section 25H but neither of respondents offered themselves for re-employment. The Award of the Tribunal and the decision of High Court set-aside. However, a direction was issued that the sums already paid to respondents shall not be recovered. Regional Manager, SBI vs. Rakesh Kumar Tewari (SC)[52] Engagement for 88 days. Labour Court committed serious irregularity in giving a finding that retrenchment illegal. No finding of fact arrived at that termination was illegal and hence question of reinstatement does not arise. Regional Manager SBI vs. Mahatma Mishra (SC)[53] Section 25 H r/w Rule 77 of ID (Central) Rules, 1957 Where 240 days of service was not put in, the provisions of Sec 25F not required to be complied with. Labour Court not arriving at finding that termination was illegal. Award of Labour Court suffered from illegality on face of record. State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur vs. Om Prakash Sharma (SC)[54] Section 25 F (Back Wages) Illegal termination does not create a right of reinstatement with full employment benefits and full back wages to an employee. Unfair and unjust to ask Appellant to pay full back wages as Appellant’s factory has been taken over by a new management altogether Unreasonable to put huge burden on Appellant by directing it to reinstate Respondent with continuity of service and with full back wages as factory of Appellant declared sick and remained closed for many years and assigned to new management. A direction was given to deposit 50 per cent of back wages by way of arrears of back wages instead of full wages as awarded by Labour Court. PVK Distillery Ltd Vs. Mahendra Ram (SC)[55] Labour Court finding termination in contravention of Section 25 F and directing reinstatement with continuity in wages and 50% back wages. Held, there is no thumb rule that in every case where the Industrial Tribunal gives a finding that the termination of service was in violation of Section 25 F, entire back wages should be awarded. A host of factors like the manner and method of selection and appointment, the nature of the appointment, whether ad hoc, short term, daily wage, temporary or permanent in character, any special qualification required for the job and the like should be weighed and balanced in taking a decision regarding award of back wages. If the workman had rendered a considerable period of service and was wrongfully terminated, he may be awarded full or partial back wages keeping in view his age and qualification possessed by him and that he may not secure another employment. However, where the length of service rendered is small, the award of back wages for the complete period from the date of his termination till the date of the award, would be wholly inappropriate. A regular service of permanent character cannot be compared to short or intermittent daily wage employment, though it may be for 240 days in a calendar year. General Manager, Haryana Roadways vs. Rudhan Singh (SC)[56] Forged and fabricated certificate submitted by Ticca Mazdoor. Services terminated. Held, completion of 240 days of continuous service did not entitle to claim permanence. Manager, RBI, Bangalore vs. S.Mani and ors (SC)[57] See also P.Thiruman vs. Presiding Officer (Mad HC)[58] Section 33 r/w Rule 61 (1) of Rules- Employer not bound to approve name of workman forwarded by trade union as protected workman, if disciplinary proceedings pending against him. HLL Lifecare Limited vs. Hindusthan Latex Labour Union (Ker HC)[59] Section 33-C(2) – Recovery application under Sec 33 C (2) for overtime allowance recoverable from railways. Preliminary objection that application not maintainable. Held, that Courts below not justified in holding that the recovery applicable is maintainable. UOI and anr vs. Kankuben (Dead) by LRs and ors (SC)[60] It is well settled that a workman can proceed under Section 33 C (2) of the ID Act only after the Tribunal has adjudicated on a complaint under Sec 33 A or on a reference under Section 10 that the order of discharge or dismissal was not justified and has set aside that order and reinstated the workman. The Supreme Court in the case of Punjab Beverages Pvt. Ltd. vs. Suresh Chand[61] held that a proceeding under Sec 33 C (2) is a proceeding in the nature of execution proceeding in which the labour court calculates the amount of money due to a workman from the employer, or, if the workman is entitled to any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money, proceeds to compute the benefit in terms of money. The right to the money which is sought to be calculated or the benefit which is sought to be computed must be an existing one, that is to say already adjudicated upon or provided for and must arise in the course of and in relation to the relationship between the industrial workman and his employer. It is not competent to the Labour Court exercising jurisdiction under Sec 33 C (2) to arrogate to itself the functions of an Industrial Tribunal and entertain a claim which is not based on an existing right but which may appropriately be made the subject matter of an industrial dispute in a reference under Section 10 of the Act. State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr vs. Brijpal Singh (SC)[62] Merely upon reinstatement, a workman would not be entitled to all his arrears of pay and allowances, in the absence of any direction for payment of back wages in the award. The appellant Corporation had terminated the services of the respondents, who claimed to be employees under the Corporation. On a dispute raised by the respondents the matter was referred to the Labour Court under the Industrial Disputes Act. The Labour Court held that termination was bad and ordered reinstatement. The appellant Corporation thereafter reinstated the respondents. Subsequently the respondents filed applications under Section 33 C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act before the Labour Court claiming back wages for the period they were out of employment. The appellant resisted the claim on the ground there was no direction for payment of back wages in the award. The Labour Court directed payment of back wages. The writ petition filed before the High Court challenging the direction for payment of back wages was also dismissed. The appeals were filed challenging the legality of the Judgment rendered by the High Court holding that the respondents are entitled to back wages. Held, whenever a workman is entitled to receive from his employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money and which he is entitled to receive from his employer and is denied of such benefit can approach Labour Court under Section 33 C (2) of the Act. The benefit sought to be enforced under Section 33 C (2) of the Act is necessarily a pre-existing benefit or one flowing from a pre-existing right. The difference between a pre-existing right or benefit on one hand and the right or benefit, which is considered just and fair on the other hand, is vital. The former falls within jurisdiction of Labour Court exercising powers under Section 33 C (2) of the Act while the latter does not. It cannot be spelt out from the award in the present case that such a right or benefit has accrued to the workman as the specific question of the relief granted is confined only to the reinstatement without stating anything more as to the back wages. Hence that relief must be deemed to have been denied, for what is claimed but not granted necessarily gets denied in judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding. Further, when a question arises as to the adjudication of a claim for back wages all relevant circumstances which will have to be gone into, are to be considered in a judicious manner. Therefore, the appropriate forum wherein such question of back wages could be decided is only in a proceeding to whom a reference under Section 10 of the Act is made. To state that merely upon reinstatement, a workman would be entitled, under the terms of award, to all his arrears of pay and allowances would be incorrect because several factors will have to be considered, as stated earlier, to find out whether the workman is entitled to back wages at all and to what extent. Therefore, we are of the view that the High Court ought not to have presumed that the award of the Labour Court for grant of back wages is implied in the relief of reinstatement or that the award of reinstatement itself conferred right for claim of back wages. APSRTC and Anr vs. BS David Paul (SC)[63] Benefits enforceable under Sec 33 C(2) is a pre-existing benefit or one flowing from pre-existing right. Claim of arrears arising out of implementation of recommendations of 5th Pay Commission cannot be said to be such enforceable benefit. UP State Road Transport Corporation vs. Sri Birendra Bhandari (SC)[64] The legal representatives/successors of the deceased workman would certainly have a right in view of the provisions of the Succession Act to make an application to the Competent Authority for making a reference. It was to be noted that they would not be making a proposal for a reference in relation to a claim which was personal to the workman. In fact, they would be making a request to the Competent Authority to make a reference in relation to the entitlement of the workman and in case, the reference was made and in case they succeed in proving that the deceased was entitled to a particular status and salary the deceased workman was entitled to receive the amount, they would be entitled to an order in their favour. Regional Manager, Bank of Baroda Vs. Gitaben Haribhai Darji (deceased through LRs) (Gujarat HC)[65] Dismissal for unauthorised absence from service. All the authorities including Central Administrative Tribunal approved the dismissal Order. Revision Petition filed by second Respondent also dismissed. Thereafter, claim Petition for back wages before Labour Court. Labour Court, allowed the claim petition and directed the Petitioner to pay back wages. Hence, the present petition. Whether Labour Court has jurisdiction to entertain a claim Petition under Section 33(C)(2). Held, Labour Court could exercise its jurisdiction to decide the entitlement of wages when the entitlement has been earlier adjudicated or recognised by the employer. Further, power of Labour Court under Section 33(C)(2) extends only to interpret an award or settlement on which claim is based. Ratio of Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ganesh Razak and Anr JT 1994 (7) SC 476=(1995) 1 LLJ 395 (SC)=(1995) 1 SCC 235 was referred. In the present case, scope of a proceeding under Section 33(C)(2) was clearly outside the jurisdiction of Labour Court since there was no earlier adjudication or recognition thereof by the employer and the dispute relating to entitlement was not incidental to the benefit claimed. Hence, an industrial disputes has to be first raised before the Appropriate Authority, which could be the appropriate forum to adjudicate the matter of dispute with regard to wages. UOI rep by the Divisional Railway Manager, Chennai Division, Southern Railway vs. The Presiding Officer, Central Government Labour Court and Sri M.Chandran [66] Labour Court allowed the application directing the Respondent to be reinstated with continuity of service and full back wages from the period of dismissal up to the date of reinstatement, which was confirmed by the Industrial Court. Petitioner filed a Writ Petition. Supreme Court confirmed the Order of the Labour Court. An application was filed by the Respondent for certain additional monetary benefits. Labour Court granted the reliefs to the Respondent. Hence, present appeal. Held, if the termination of an employee’s service is found to be illegal, there must follow a presumption that the employee was willing to work but was prevented from doing so as a result of his services having been terminated. It would be incorrect to reject the claim for incentive bonus in its entirety merely on the ground that the Respondent did not in fact work at the relevant time. Having succeeded in his application for reinstatement, it should follow that as he was willing to work at the relevant time, but was wrongly prevented from doing so, he is entitled to the incentive bonus. It is on this basis that back wages are payable despite the fact that the employee had not worked during this period. For the same reason, an employee whose services are illegally terminated ought to be entitled to the incentive bonus. Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai, through the General Manager, Brihanmumbai Electric Supply and Transport Undertaking vs. Mohanrao Buwasaheb Shinde (Bombay HC)[67] Employee was already fitted in particular scale of pay and after reinstatement, was appointed to same post and there was nothing in order refitting in any other scale of pay. Therefore, benefit of such revision goes to employee also so long as there was nothing in award to indicate that he should not be entitled to new scale of pay. When order of reinstatement passed by employer did not in least indicate that he should not be entitled to benefits of revision of pay scale, it could not now be contended that should not be entitled to benefit of new scale of pay unless employer chooses to fit Petitioner in new scale of pay which came into force during period, was out of service as result of wrongful dismissal. It restores employee and employer to original relationship maintaining status quo ante and employee could not be denied all incidental benefits which accrued to post which was deemed to have been held without break by reason of reinstatement. Section 33C(2) of Act was wide enough to cover cases like where Labour Court merely gave benefit of back wages without specifying amount employee had become entitled to receive from employer. Therefore, impugned order was liable to be revised and case was remanded back to Labour Court for recalculating amount. Writ petition was only regarding validity of award of Industrial Tribunal and compliance thereof, therefore subsequent termination was of no avail. Accordingly writ petition filed by State against award was dismissed and writ petition filed by workman against computation of wages under Section 33C(2) of Act was partly allowed and matter was remanded back. State of Rajasthan and ors vs. Harish Chandra Sharma and Ors (Rajasthan HC)[68] Whether, Petitioner workman was entitled to be paid subsistence. Held, after advent of Payment of Subsistence Allowance Act, exclusively provides for subsistence allowance for employees pending enquiry and Petitioner/workman is covered by said definition of employee under Act. However, fancy claim made by workman seeking for payment under several heads including claim for full wages were all without any basis. Further, claim under Section 33(C)(2) of Act was available only when there was entitlement either under any law, contract, settlement or under Award. Thus, second Respondent Society was correct in contending that all sums computed by Labour Court could not be granted. Therefore, workman was only eligible for subsistence allowance in terms of Rules, which were applicable to him K.Chandrabani vs The Presiding Officer, Labour Court and The Panruti Agricultural Producers Co-operative Marketing Society (Madras HC)[69] Labour Court by Award directed Petitioner to pay sum under head of unpaid salary, overtime wages, leave Salary and bonus. Hence, this Petition. Whether, Award of Labour Court was justified? Held, it was clear that except oral evidence of workman and legal notice and letter of workman. There was no other document on behalf of workman either to prove that workman was appointed by Petitioner as his employee on payment. So also, there was no document on behalf of workman to show that workman had worked overtime and was entitled for particular amount either monthly or in lumpsum. There was not even single document to show number of hours workman worked and the period he actually worked. Similarly, there was no document to prove either P.F. contributions by workman and earned leave salary etc. Hence, there was no evidence on behalf of workman to prove his claim and therefore, Labour Court had erroneously awarded amount. Mohammed Abdul Mallik vs. The Presiding Officer, IInd Additional Labour Court and T.Karunakaran (Madras HC)[70] Tribunal held that Respondent was not aware of posting orders as it was not served and he was entitled to back wages till he was allowed to join duty. Held, question of back wages could be decided only in a proceeding to which a reference under Section 10 of the Act was made. However, Labour Court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate claim made by Respondent under Section 33-C(2) of the I.D. Act in an undetermined claim and until such adjudication was made by appropriate forum. Respondent-workman could not ask Labour Court in an application under Section 33-C(2) of the I.D. Act to disregard his dismissal as wrongful and on that basis to compute his wages. Therefore, Labour Court erred in allowing application filed under Section 33-C(2) of the I.D. Act for ordering payment of not only salary but also bonus to workman. Thus, order of Court to extent of computing arrears of wages from the date of award till date of reinstatement was quashed as without jurisdiction. Depot Manager APSRTC vs. Mirza Basheer Baig and Anr (AP HC)[71] See also- HP State Electricity Board vs. Krishnan Dutt (HP HC) –Claim for bonus could not be computed under Sec 33 © (2)[72] Section 36 - A notification has been issued on 09.06.2011 in the Gazette notifying that Section 30 of the Advocates Act, 1961 shall come into force with effect from 15.06.2011. Section 30 of the Advocates Act provides that every Advocate shall as of right be entitled to practice before all Courts including the Supreme Court, before any Tribunal or person legally authorized to take evidence; and before any other authority or person before whom such advocate is by or under any law for the time being in force entitled to practice. Now with the observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Hygienic Foods vs. Jasbir Singh and Ors it is appropriate for the Central Government to consider amendment to this provision of the ID Act to enable Advocates to represent the matter before the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal irrespective of consent from the applicant. The issue is whether provisions debarring lawyers from appearing before the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal under Section 36 (4) of the ID Act or under Section 13 of the Family Courts Act is unconstitutional. The Hon’ble Supreme Court made prima facie observations that industrial law as well as family law have become so complex that an ordinary layman could not possibly be expected to put up his/her case property before the Courts/Tribunals. The matter is yet to receive a final verdict from the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Hygienic Foods vs. Jasbir Singh and Ors (SC)[73] Labour Court upheld right of practising advocate and member of Managing Committee of Employers' Association to represent Respondent-company under Section 36(2) of I.D. Act. Whether provisions of Section 36 of Act barred appearance of legal practitioner even though he was member of Managing Committee of Employers' Association. Held, Section 2(a) of Section 36 of Act provided that an officer of association of employers of which he was member is entitled to represent employer. Object of Section 36 of Act was to enable employee or employer to be represented by persons who could effectively espouse their cause, barring legal practitioners in conciliation proceedings or proceedings before Court. However, meaning of word 'officer' in Sub-Section 2 could be taken to carry same meaning for purpose of representation, as substituted in Section 36(1) of Act. Hence, practising advocate and member of Managing Committee of Employers' Association was entitled to represent Respondent in his capacity as member of Committee. R.Rajamani vs. The PO, II Addl. Labour Court and P.V.Sundaram (Director), Addisons Paints and Chemical Limited (Mad HC)[74] Office bearer filed representation before Industrial Tribunal. Tribunal permitted Vice-President of respondent to represent body of workmen. Petitioner filed suit before Trial Court, which was dismissed. Disputed question is that whether office-bearer of worker's union, who is not workman under Management can represent said union in industrial dispute pending before Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal. Held, superannuated workman, if he continues to be office-bearer of Workmen's Union, can be permitted to represent workmen before Tribunal or Labour Court under Section 36 of Act. Brooke Bond Lipton India Ltd Vs. Brooke Bond Sramik Union (Orissa HC)[75] Present appeal is filed for challenging order of Single Judge whereby Single Judge has allowed writ petition and permitted Respondent to engage counsel in pending case. Held, it appears from reading of Section 34(4) of Act that it is necessary that consent of other party has to be obtained for purpose of engaging legal practitioner. On simple interpretation of Section 36(4) of Act it is not possible to hold that Labour Court has inherent power or jurisdiction to grant permission for engaging lawyer irrespective of consent of other party or not. It is found that Single Judge has substantially allowed present petition and permitted Respondent to engage lawyer. In view of aforesaid position of law, it is found that impugned order and judgment of Single Judge in present writ petition is unsustainable in law. View taken by Single Judge that even in absence of consent Labour Court has power or jurisdiction to grant permission to engage lawyer by party in litigation in Labour Court is not correct view both on plain and simple interpretation of Section 36(4) of Act. In aforesaid circumstances, impugned order and judgment is unsustainable in law. Chandrakant vs. All India Reporter Ltd and Anr (Bombay HC)[76] Representation of employee by Recognised Union and Application of Section 20(2) (b) of Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (MRTU and PULP Act). Petitioners employees filed a claim for illegal termination against Respondent No.3- employer before the Labour Commissioner. Assistant Labour Commissioner rejected the claim on the ground that the Petitioners being a member of the recognised Union had to be represented through the Union. Petitioners contended that the Recognised Union colluded in illegal termination of the Petitioners by forcing them to sign the VRS scheme. Held, Section 20(2)(b) of the Act not at all attracted in the present case in as much as the same does not apply to proceedings in which the legality or propriety of an Order of dismissal/discharge/removal/retrenchment /termination of service/suspension of an employee is under consideration. In the present case, it was the contention of the Petitioners that their services have been illegally terminated by the third Respondent by forcibly obtaining their signatures on the forms of the said Scheme. Thus, Petitioner’s case was in respect of “illegal termination of services”. Consequently, such case should not have been thrown out at the threshold by the Assistant Labour Commissioner by relying on Section 20(2)(b) of Act, which has no application at all. Held, the provision of Section 36 of the said Act spell out “an entitlement” of a workman to be represented in any proceeding under these Acts. “An entitlement” of a workmen cannot converted into “a mandatory obligation” disabling” a workman from representing his own case individually on the sole ground that he must come through a recognised union, even if he is trying to make out a his grievance against the office bearers of the very same recognised union itself. Therefore, Section 36 of the said Act has no applicability to the proceedings in issue before the Assistant Labour Commissioner. Narayan N.More and Ors vs. State of Maharashtra through the Secretary, Ministry of Labour (Bombay HC)[77] Sub-section (2) of Section 36 enables the engaging of the services of the officer of the company or the officers of the association or of a federation, to which the management is a member, not withstanding that the officer or office bearer is incidentally a legal practitioner. Sub-section (4) of Section 36 cannot prevent such authorised person incidentally being a legal practitioner from appearing before the industrial concern. On facts, held that the respondent has produced material to show that the person who is authorised to represent it in the Industrial Tribunal, is the office bearer of ICEA and ICEA is an association of employers only. Order of the Learned Single Judge permitting the management to engage the services of the office bearers of ICEA, is upheld. B.Yellappa vs. Steel Authority of India Ltd (Karnataka HC)[78] Whether legal practitioners who are office bearers of a federation or association of employers are entitled to represent the Petitioner-employer who was a member of association under Section 36(2) of the I.D. Act. Held, Section 36(4) bars engaging the services of advocate simpliciter. But as per the Section 36(1) and (2) employer was entitled to be represented by an advocate, who is an office bearer of such association or of a federation notwithstanding that he is a legal practitioner and Section 36(4) of the Act does not prevent, him from appearing before the Tribunal. In present case, advocates are not representing the Petitioner as advocate simplicitor, but as office bearers. Tribunal could not go into the motive as to why the legal practitioners who are office bearers of the association are asked to represent the Petitioner. Order of Labour Court barring the engagement of legal practitioners who are office bearers of a federation to represent Petitioner held not sustainable. Steel Authority of India Ltd vs. B.Yellappa (Karnataka HC)[79] Single Judge allowed Petition filed by Respondent employee and held that Regulation 12(8) entitled employee to seek assistance of office bearer of union to which he belonged in course of domestic enquiry against such employee. Whether, expression "office bearer" under above regulation would exclude person, who happen to be legal practitioner. Held, legal practitioner was prohibited from representing an employee in domestic enquiry before enquiry officer. However, that did not mean that any person who had obtained LL.B. degree or was practicing advocate was debarred from appearing in domestic enquiry even though he was office bearer of union. Therefore, prohibition would arise only when relationship of lawyer and client arose between employee and person engaged to represent employee in domestic enquiry and not when relationship between employee and person appointed to assist him. Thus, prohibition could not be applied to cases where office bearer happens to be legal practitioner and said prohibition would operate only when employee wanted to engage lawyer. Appeal dismissed. Ratio Decidendi “Prohibition against legal practitioner being engaged in domestic enquiry shall not apply to case where office bearer happens to be legal practitioner." Board of Trustees of Port of Mumbai and Ors vs. Vidyadhar Pandurang Rane (Bombay HC)[80] Present revision petition filed against order by which Labour Court had not granted any leave to concerned Consultant/Advocate to appear before Labour Court on behalf of Employer. Held, according to Section 36 of Act, in case of workman, he could be represented in proceeding under Act by any member of executive or any office bearer of registered union. But under Section 36(2) of Act, only officer of association of employers' can represent member of association. Therefore it was necessary to find out whether alleged consultant could be treated as officer of said Union. It was true that neither the Act nor any other labour law pertaining to proceeding before labour court has given the definition of word "officer". If we see its Dictionary meaning, if a person trained and commissioned to engage in paid full time service, then he would become officer. Officer must be holding office and taking part in management or directions of employer institution. He must be trained and engaged in discharging duty and he must be paid fully for services rendered by him. As stated earlier, word used was 'officer' and not as office bearer. Alleged consultant had fairly stated that he was till today practicing advocate of this Court. For appearance before Labour Court / Industrial Tribunal, legal practitioner should be regular officer of such Employers' Association / Union, otherwise it will defeat provisions of Section 36(2) and (4) of Act. Alleged consultant not produced any documentary evidence before this Court or before labour court to show that said Union had appointed him as officer by its resolution or by any order of said Union. Merely because he happened to be General Secretary, it could not be said that he was officer of association. It amply clear that by virtue of Section 36(3) of Act, legal practitioner was forbidden from appearing in any proceedings before Court. It was also clear that there was nothing on record to show that alleged consultant, who later on filed his authorisation to appear on behalf of employer, was "officer of association representing employers". Considering provision and spirit of Section 36 of Act, it was amply clear that Legislature expected only officer of association representing employers to be permitted to represent case of employers as against "officer bearers of union of workmen". It, therefore, cannot be said that error was committed either by Labour Court or by this Court while not permitting alleged consultant to represent case of Appellants. Gujarat Flavours Pvt Limited and Anr vs. Rajubhai @ Tulsidas R.Patel and Anr (Gujarat HC)[81] Labour Court sustained objection raised on part of workmen stating that unless there was a consent given by workmen, as a matter of right, Management could not hire services of a trained lawyer. Whether, Respondent Managements were entitled to engage legal practitioner? Held, withholding consent by workmen was never contemplated in case where workmen had engaged trained lawyer. In exercising their right of withholding consent, workman and his representative waited for 55 adjournments and had allowed Management to be represented by lawyer including filing vakalat at an earlier point of time and had raised this issue after period of five years. Therefore, impugned orders passed by first Respondent Labour Courts were set aside and directed that Respondent Managements were entitled to engage legal practitioner of their own choice. The Management, Hindustan Motors Earth Moving Equipment Division Limited, Chennai Car Plant vs. The Presiding Officer, Labour Court (Madras HC)[82] Whether Petitioner rightly contended that lawyer could represent before Tribunal in capacity as office bearer of registered trade union and no consent of other side or leave of Tribunal was necessary and, rejection of application of Petitioner was per se illegal. Held, lawyer simpliciter could not appear before Industrial Tribunal without consent of opposite party. However, in present case, J /officer of Chamber of Commerce and Industry, of which Petitioner firm was member and when this being position, J could represent Petitioner/firm before Respondent No. 1 as lawyer could appear before tribunal in capacity of officer bearer/officer of registered trade union and no consent of other side and leave of Tribunal would be necessary. Findings recorded by Labour Court were not based on correct appreciation of facts arid law available on record and it could be said that findings of Labour Court were erroneous or perverse or patently unreasonable and hence findings of Labour Court suffered from basic illegality and infirmity. Grapes Synthetics Pvt Ltd vs. The Judge, Labour Court and Anr (Rajasthan HC)[83] Objection to represent the reference as an advocate. Objection rejected by Labour Court. Held, there was no occasion for the Labour Court to come to a conclusion that Respondent was an officer of the Traders and Manufacturers Association merely on the ground that he was an Assistant Secretary of the Association for two years. For the aforesaid reasons, present Court was of the view that the order cannot stand and liable to be quashed. Thus, directed that the Respondent cannot be permitted to appear through any practising lawyer by the Labour Court. Writ application allowed. Rakesh Ranjan Keshri vs. The Presiding Officer, Labour Court and Anr (Patna HC)[84] Industrial Tribunal allowed application filed by Respondent Nos. 1 to 4 and granted permission to Mr. Satyanarayan Hegde advocate to appear in matter on basis of power of attorney attached to Application. Whether, employer or employee had right to appoint person of his choice to represent himself before Industrial Court. Held, lawyer, simpliciter could not appear before an Industrial Tribunal without consent of Opposite party and leave of Tribunal merely by virtue of Power of Attorney executed by party. Lawyer could appear before Tribunal in capacity of an office bearer of registered trade union or an officer of Associations of employers and no consent of other side and leave of Tribunal would then be necessary. Thus, Mr. Hegde Advocate to represent Respondent Nos. 1 to 4 could not have allowed in view of provisions of Order 3 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It was not in consonance with interpretation of Section 36(4) of the Act that Party to dispute might be represented by legal practitioner with consent of other parties to proceeding and with leave of Labour Court. Hence, decision of Industrial Court allowing Mr. Hegde, advocate to represent Respondent Nos. 1 to 4 in pending References was set aside. However, Nitin Thakur was regular labour law practitioner and that he had been appeared in various matters before Labour Court, Industrial Court. Hence, Mr. Nitin Thakur could be appointed by Respondent Nos. 1 to 4 as representative under Power of Attorney. Petition allowed.Ratio Decidendi "Party to dispute may be represented by legal practitioner with consent of other parties to proceeding and with leave of Labour Court." Maharashtra Employees Union vs. MK Metal Industries and others (Bombay HC)[85] Question before the Court was Whether management is not entitled to be represented by a legal practitioner without the consent of the workman? Held, Section 36(4) permits representation of a party by a legal practitioner only with the consent of the other party to the proceedings and with the leave of the Tribunal. No application filed by the petitioner company to be represented by a counsel nor any leave was granted by the Tribunal to allow the counsel for the petitioner/management to appear and defend him. Hence, petition dismissed. Bhagat Brothers vs. Paras Nath Upadhyay (Delhi HC)[86] Present writ petition is filed for challenging order whereby dismissed petitioner's application made for disallowing any request made by respondent to engage an advocate or legal practitioner and consequently accord permission to respondent no.1 to avail service of an advocate. Held, question that is arising for consideration in this very matter, fell for consideration before this Court, in an unreported judgment in T. Sudhakar Rao v. Management of Eenadu Telugu Daily wherein this Court took view that once workman had benefit of availing service of a legal practitioner, management cannot be driven to a disadvantageous position. Tribunal followed said judgment and overruled objection raised by petitioner. Apart from applying said precedent, Tribunal had undertaken extensive discussion, on development of law on this branch. Though application filed by petitioner is not referable to any particular provision, Tribunal had examined core of issue and gave its verdict. This court is of view that conclusions arrived at by Tribunal are correct and based on thorough analysis of facts and law. B.M.Jambunathan vs United News of India rep by its General Manager and anr (AP HC)[87] Writ Petitions challenging the provisions of Section 36(4) of the Industrial Dispute Act as being unconstitutional. Whether the denial of legal representation by one party to another in an Industrial Dispute would tantamount to denial of reasonable opportunity to represent their cases before the Tribunal and the same would amount to injustice to the litigating parties Held, that the law has recognized the unequal strength of the Parties in adjudication proceedings related to an Industrial Dispute The intention of the Legislation in question is to discourage the representation by legal practitioners and to dispose of the cases expeditiously Therefore, as the language of Section 36 is unambiguous in its meaning and effect, the Court cannot interpret it differently to invoke the plea of injustice Therefore, the said provisions cannot be held to be unconstitutional Management of Muttrapore Tea Estate vs. Presiding Officer, Labour Court and Ors (Gujarat HC)[88] Application for adjournment of proceedings to engage legal practitioner. Application not opposed by respondent. Matter adjourned by Court as per such application implied consent of opposite party to application has to be inferred. Act does not provide for express consent of parties on application for permission to appoint legal practitioner opposite party once consented to appointment of legal practitioner cannot withdraw such consent petitioner entitled to be represented by legal practitioner. Baroda Ispat P Ltd vs. Ramgopal M.Patel and ors (Gujarat HC)[89] Also Refer South Arcot Vallalar District Mazdoor Union Vs. Presiding Officer (Mad HC)[90] Unfair Labour Practice/Lifting of Veil Factual details that arose in Indian Petrochemicals Corporation Ltd. and Another v. Shramik Sena and Ors. AIR 1999 SC 2577=(1999) 6 SCC 439 decided by three-judge Bench identical to case on hand wherein it was held that canteen in the establishment of the Management is a statutory canteen and the respondent workmen are in fact the workmen of the appellant Management and the contractor was engaged only for the purpose of record and for all purposes the workmen are in fact the workmen of the Management. The Industrial Court found that most the workers have worked for more than 10 years and dates of joining not disputed by the Company. Inspite of changes in Canteen Contractor the service of canteen employees continued and were not issued fresh appointment orders by any of the canteen contractors. Company provided canteen premises free of rent along with free water, electricity, fuel, furniture, fixtures, crockery and all cooking utensils. Rates of meals, eatables, snacks, tea and beverages etc. fixed by company. Though responsibility was cast upon the contractor to make payment of wages, P.F. contribution etc. on submission of the bills, the amounts paid/reimbursed by the company. Details clearly show that ultimately it is the company which pays all the amounts. Activities of the workmen in the canteen, their suitability to work, physical fitness are ultimately controlled by the company. Industrial Court perfectly right in arriving the conclusion that the evidence coupled with the terms of agreement show that the contract was nothing but paper agreement. Industrial Court rightly concluded that the company has committed unfair labour practice under Item 9 of Schedule IV of the MRTU and PULP Act, 1971 and issued appropriate directions. Even though the record shows that canteen is being run by the contractor, ultimate control and supervision over the canteen is of the Company. Hindalco Industries Ltd vs. Association of Engineering Workers (SC)[91] Tribunal held that the members of the Union were indeed the employees of the ONGC and a direction was accordingly issued that their services be regularized. On appeal, the Single Judge allowed the Writ Petition. Writ appeal was filed by the Union before the Division Bench of the High Court which, reversed the findings of the Single Judge. Hence, the present appeal. Appellant contended that a workman who had worked for 240 days or more could not claim regularisation of services and contractual workers were not entitled to regularisation. Respondent contended that the Industrial Tribunal was the sole fact finding authority and interference by the Single Bench of the High Court in its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 could be justified only if the findings could be said to be perverse. Whether the High Court had the authority to enquire as to whether a finding arrived at by the Tribunal was based on evidence and to correct an error apparent on the face of the record. Held, High Court would be fully justified in interfering with an Award of an Industrial Court on account of a patent illegality and not otherwise. No perversity or patent illegality in the Award of the Industrial Tribunal and that it has minutely examined the evidence in arriving at its decision. Hence, it was inappropriate for the Single Judge to have re-appraised the evidence and come to a different conclusion. Findings of Industrial Tribunal and Division Bench upheld. What is the status of the workmen and whether they were the employees of the ONGC or the contractor and in the event that they were employees of the former, whether a claim to be treated at par with other such employees. Held, Industrial Tribunal found from the records and evidence that there existed a relationship of master and servant and there was no contractor appointed by ONGC. Hence, by lifting the veil in order to determine as to the nature of employment it was found that the workmen were the employees of the ONGC and would ipso-facto be entitled to all benefits available in that capacity. Industrial Tribunal and the Division Bench justified in lifting the veil in order to determine as to the nature of employment. GM ONGC Silchar vs. ONGC Contractual Workers Union (SC)[92] Alternative Remedy It was for Petitioner to approach Labour Court under Section 33(2)(b) or even Payment of Wages Authority claiming his due salary and computation could be made by concerned Court/Authority only as per evidence led by both the sides. Present Court under its writ jurisdiction did not sit as an executing Court in such matters, when Petitioner had sufficient effective alternative remedies under various labour laws itself. Radhey Shyam Chipa vs. RSRTC and Anr (Rajasthan HC)[93] The question as to withdrawal of construction allowance to workers by employer violating Section 9A of the ID Act was questioned by way of writ petition. This is essentially a question of fact and a statutory remedy by way of redress under ID Act was available. No exceptional circumstances made out to entertain Writ Petition. Hindustan Steel Works Construction Ltd. and anr vs. Hindustan Steel Works Construction Ltd. Employees Union (SC)[94] Whether or not the Respondent worked for 240 days is a question of fact and cannot be examined by the High Court in a Writ Petition. Proper remedy for claimant is to raise industrial dispute. Chairman, ONGC Ltd Vs. Shyamal Chandra Bhowmik (SC)[95] No proposition of law that once petition admitted, it could never be dismissed on ground of alternative remedy. State of UP and Anr vs. UP Rajya Khanij Vikas Nigam SS and ors (SC)[96] Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain matter relating to industrial dispute The matter is squarely covered by the decision in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation vs. Krishna Kant 1995 (2) LLN 271, where it has been held that Civil Court would have no jurisdiction to entertain such matters. There is an alternative remedy available under the ID Act. Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation and Anr vs. Khadarmal (SC)[97] Delay – Laches in Raising Industrial Dispute There is no period of limitation to raise an industrial dispute, but the conduct of approaching the Labour Court after more than seven years is a relevant factor which has to be taken into account for refusing to grant any relief. The Labour Court’s refusal to grant relief cannot be said to be irrelevant. Labour Court cannot be said to have exercised its jurisdiction injudiciously, arbitrarily or capriciously warranting interference. Harayana State Co-op Land Development Bank Vs. Neelam (SC)[98] Also Refer: Kuldeep Singh vs. GM, Instrument Design Development and Facilities Centre (SC)[99] Regularisation/Permanent Absorption Concept of regularisation linked with Article 14. Though Industrial adjudicator can vary terms of contract of employment, he cannot do something violative of Article 14. If case covered by concept of regularisation, same cannot be viewed differently. Direction for regularisation, as given could not have been given in view of what is stated in Uma Devi, (2006) 4 SCC 1=2006 (5) AWC 5325 (SC). Impugned judgment set aside. UP Power Corporation Ltd and Anr vs. Bijli Mazdoor Sangh and ors (SC)[100] Claim for regularisation on the basis that they had been in continuous service for more than ten years since the day of their initial appointment. In the matter of Official Liquidator vs Dayanand and Ors the Supreme Court held that any direction by Court for absorption of all company paid staff would be detrimental to public interest in more than one ways, it will compel Government to abandon policy decision of reducing direct recruitment to various services, it will be virtual abrogation of statutory rules which envisage appointment to different cadres by direct recruitment. Therefore, claims of Respondents for regularization or absorption cannot be sustained. State of Karnataka and Ors vs. Ganapathi Chaya Nayak and Ors (SC)[101] Budlee Sepoys engaged on temporary basis in the leave vacancies. Scheme formulated for deployment/absorption of Budlee sepoys clearly indicating the absorption/regularization to be subject to completion of 240 days in a block year of 12 months or a calendar year and availability of vacancies arising in future. Writ Petitions were filed by the Respondents praying for direction to the Bank for regularization of their service as subordinate staff in the Bank. Respondents were given an option for post of subordinate staff in non-CCA areas in West Bengal. No appointment alleged to be given despite Respondents having exercised their option. Later barring few, the rest were not regularized. On appeal, the High Court directed relaxation from the norm of 240 days if the shortfall was marginal. On further appeal, the Division Bench directed Appellants to proceed on the basis that each of the Respondents had completed 240 days in the block of 12 calendar months. Held, the onus was on the employee to establish that he had worked for more than 240 days. High Court not right in holding without factual aspect having been established by the respondents that each of them had worked for more than 240 days. Effect of decision not to fill up the vacancy also not considered - Scheme of Budlee days different as it denote actual working days. Whenever Respondents completed 240 days Budlee work in a year or block of 12 months, their cases would be considered in the light of the scheme. Bank of India and Anr vs. Tarun Kr. Biswan and ors (SC)[102] Merely because a temporary employee completed 240 days of work, he would not be entitled to be regularized in service. If appointment itself made without jurisdiction, it is void. Appointment having been made only to meet exigencies of service and not in terms of services regulations. Though, the employee completed 240 days of service and termination of his services without compliance of Section 25 F was illegal and the employee continued in service by virtue of an interim order, interest of justice will be subserved, if compensation is paid instead of reinstatement. Branch Manager, MP State Agro Industries Development Corpn Ltd and anr Vs. SC Pandey (SC)[103] Employment on temporary basis for one year during 1974 and such employment not in accordance with recruitment rules. Industrial dispute raised in 1986. It is wholly unjust to direct reinstatement after lapse of a considerable time. Interest of justice will be subserved, if ` 50,000/- is paid. UP State Road Transport Corporation vs. Man Singh (SC)[104] [1] Act 24 of 2010 [2] Government of India Notification No.S.O.2278(E) dated 15.09.2010 [3] Section 2 (a) (i) and Section 2 (a) (ii) [4] Section 2 (5) (iv) [5] Section 2 A (2) [6] Section 2 A (3) [7] Section 7 (3) (f) and Section 7 A (3) (b) [8] Chapter II B – Section 9 C (1) to (8) [9] Section 11 (9) and Section 11 (10) [10] Act 32 of 1987 w.e.f 27.07.1987 (Andhra Pradesh), Act 5 of 1988 w.e.f. 1.11.1988 (Tamil Nadu) & Karnataka Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1987 [11] HC Arora Vs. Union of India – Civil Writ Petition No.2798/2006 [12] Report No.225 of the Law Commission of India dated 25.06.2009 [13] AIR 1987 SC 386 = 1987 (1) SCALE 1317 [15] Words in italics inserted by Amendment Act 35 of 65 w.e.f. 01.12.1965 [16] 2010 (127) FLR 1001=(2010) 4 LLJ 449 (Bom) [17] AIR 2005 SC 1050=(2005) 1 LLJ 1122 (SC)=(2005) 3 SCC 232 [18] (2007) II LLJ 887 (Cal) [19] (2011) II LLJ 276 (Bombay) [20] (2011) 1 LLJ 724 (Bom)=2010 (126)FLR 1031 [21] AIR 2006 SC 3229=(2006) III LLJ 1037 (SC)=(2007 1 SCC (L&S) 630 [22] JT 2008 (2) SC 161=(2008) 3 SCC 571 [23] AIR 2006 SC 296=JT 2005 (9) SC 413=(2005) 12 SCC 738 [24] (2010) II LLJ 403 (Bom)=2010 (126) FLR 23 [25] (2011) 1 LLJ 211 (Bombay) [26] (2011) II LLJ 182 (Gujarat) [27] AIR 2009 SC 2528=(2009) III LLJ 591 SC=(2009) 7 SCC 552 [28] AIR 2005 SC 1924=(2005) II LLJ 156 (SC)=(2005) 3 SCC 401 [29] AIR 2005 SC 1993=(2005) 1 LLJ 1129 SC=(2005) 3 SCC 134 [30] JT 2007 (13) SC 404=(2008) 1 LLJ 676 (SC)=(2008) 1 SCC 115 [31] AIR 2005 SC 3417=(2005) III LLJ 725 (SC)=(2005) 7 SCC 338 [32] (2011) 1 LLJ 529 (Mad) [33] (2011) II LLJ 553 (Madras HC) [34] (2011) II LLJ 16 (MP) [35] (2008) III LLJ 70 (Delhi) [36] (2005) III LLJ 390 (Delhi) [37] (2007) II LLJ 350 (Delhi) [38] (2008) II LLJ 1 (SC)=(2008) 12 SCC 726=JT 2008 (5) SC 546 [39] (2011) 1 LLJ 61 (Gujarat) [40] (2011) 1 LLJ 622 (Bombay) [41] (2011) 1 LLJ 759 (Gujarat) [42] AIR 2007 SC 262=(2006) 8 SCC 647=JT 2006 (9) SC 247 [43] AIR 2006 SC 2691=JT 2006 (6) SC 136=(2006) III LLJ 783 SC=(2006) 5 SCC 523 [44] AIR 2008 SC 2504=(2008) III LLJ 614 (SC)=(2008) 7 SCC 594 [45] AIR 2005 SC 2799=JT 2005 (3) SC 312=(2005) II LLJ 475 (SC)=(2005) 10 SCC 792 [46] AIR 2006 SC 110=JT 2005 (9) SC 54=(2006) 1 LLJ 424 (SC)=(2005) 8 SCC 750 [47] AIR 2005 SC 1933=JT 2005 (3) SC 20=(2005) II LLJ 161 SC= (2005) 3 SCC 409 [48] AIR 2009 SC 3004=(2009) 15 SCC 327=JT 2009 (9) SC 396 [49] AIR 2006 SC 2614=JT 2006 (6) SC 394=(2006) III LLJ 492 (SC)=(2006) 6 SCC 221 [50] JT 2010 (9) SC 262=(2010) IV LLJ 617 (SC)=(2010) 9 SCC 126 [51] (2011) 1 LLJ 462 (Rajasthan) [52] AIR 2006 SC 839=(2006) 1 SCC 530=JT 2006 (1) SC 252=(2006) 1 LLJ 48 (SC) [53] JT 2006 (10) SC 179=2006 (11) SCALE 258 [54] JT 2006 (11) SC 286=(2006) II LLJ 1046 (SC)=(2006) 5 SCC 123 [55] AIR 2009 SC 2205=JT 2009 (3) SC 169=(2009) 5 SCC 705 [56] AIR 2005 SC 3966=JT 2005 (6) SC 137=(2005) III LLJ 4 SC=(2005) 5 SCC 591 [57] AIR 2005 SC 2179=JT 2005 (3) SC 248=(2005) II LLJ 258 (SC)=(2005) 5 SCC 100 [58] (2011) 1 LLJ 284 (Mad) [59] (2011) II LLJ 375 (Kerala) [60] AIR 2006 SC 1784=(2006) II LLJ 280 (SC) [61] (1978) 2 SCC 144 [62] AIR 2006 SC 3592=JT 2005 (12) SC 498=(2005) 8 SCC 58 [63] AIR 2006 SC 961=JT 2006 (2) SC 149=(2006) 1 LLJ 999 (SC)=(2006) 2 SCC 282 [64] AIR 2006 SC 3220=(2006) III LLJ 969 (SC)=(2006) 10 SCC 211 [65] (2006) 1 LLJ 40 (Gujarat) [66] 2007 (114) FLR 94=(2007) 4 MLJ 1257 (Madras) [67] (2009) II LLJ 637 (Bombay) [68] (2007) 112 FLR 968 (RAJ) [69] (2007) 1 MLJ 517 [70] (2007) II LLJ 281 (MADRAS) [71] (2006) 1 ALD 685 [72] (2011) 1 LLJ 115 (HP) [73] 2011 (4) UJ 2149 (SC) [74] (2007) II LLJ 704 (Madras) [75] (2005) II LLJ 185 (Orissa) [76] (2005) II LLJ 290 (Bombay) [77] (2008) 110 Bom LR 2259=(2008) 6 Mah LJ 472 [78] (2008) II LLJ 612 (Karnataka) [79] ILR 2007 Kar 164=2007 (114) FLR 1022 [80] (2006) 1 LLJ 309 (Bombay) [81] MANU/GJ/0297/2011 [82] (2007) II LLJ 59 (Madras) [83] 2005 (105) FLR 935 [84] 2011 (129) FLR 292 [85] (2010) IV LLJ 212 (Bombay) [86] 2008 (117) FLR 1007 [87] 2008 (4) ALD 754=2008 (5) ALT 34=2008 (119) FLR 336 [88] (2005) 1 LLJ 660 (Gauhati) [89] (2005) 1 GLR 153 [90] (2011) IV LLJ 146 (Madras) [91] AIR 2008 SC 1867=JT 2008 (4) SC 211=(2008) II LLJ 697 (SC)=(2008) 13 SCC 441 [92] JT 2008 (7) SC 309=(2008) II LLJ 1071 (SC)=(2008) 8 SCALE 665 [93] RLW 2005 (3) RAJ 1592=MANU/RH/0133/2005 [94] (2005) III LLJ 512 (SC)=(2005) 6 SCC 725 [95] AIR 2006 SC 392=(2006) 1 LLJ 419 (SC)=(2006) 1 SCC 357 [96] JT 2008 (6) SC 489=(2008) 12 SCC 675 [97] (2006) SCC L&S 56 [98] AIR 2005 SC 1843=JT 2005 (2) SC 600=(2005) 1 LLJ 1153 (SC)=(2005) 5 SCC 91 [99] (2011) 1 LLJ 615 (SC) [100] (2007) II LLJ 832 (SC)=(2007) 5 SCC 755=JT 2007 (5) SC 611 [101] JT 2010 (1) SC 453=(2010) II LLJ 293(SC)=(2010) 3 SCC 115 [102] AIR 2007 SC 2669=JT 2007 (9) SC 543=(2007) 7 SCC 114 [103] JT 2006 (3) SC 348 = 2006 II LLJ 215 SC = 2006 (2) SCALE 619 = 2006 2 SCC 716 [104] (2006) 3 LLJ 1058 (SC)=(2006)7 SCC 752